I model a where shareholders choose the manager's compensation in light of the manager's dual roles of exerting effort and making disclosures regarding the 's value. Because of limited contracting ability and the divergence of short-term interest between shareholder and manager, shareholders may be unable to obtain their -best choices of effort and disclosure policy; where agency costs are too large, shareholders will be unwilling to award performance-based compensation, which induces both effort and fraudulent reporting. The principal are (1) fraud and effort are positively correlated, and given a poor outcome fraud is more likely to obtain when effort is exerted in equilibrium, (2) the incidence of fraud-inducing compensation increases as agency costs decrease, and (3) reductions in agency costs actually increase the incidence of fraud when agency costs are high. unable to obtain their …rst-best choices of e¤ort and disclosure policy; where agency costs are too large, shareholders will be unwilling to award performance-based compensation, which induces both e¤ort and fraudulent reporting. The principal …ndings are (1) fraud and e¤ort are positively correlated, and given a poor outcome fraud is more likely to obtain when e¤ort is exerted in equilibrium, (2) the incidence of fraud-inducing compensation increases as agency costs decrease, and (3) reductions in agency costs actually increase the incidence of fraud when agency costs are high.
Introduction
It is relatively rare that a complaint of securities fraud alleges that management's motive for the fraud was to steal from the …rm in a direct sense, such as actually running o¤ with bags of loot. Rather, the self-serving incentives for fraud are typically thought to be more subtle: "managers hide bad news because they fear loss of their jobs.... and they overstate favorable developments or in ‡ate earnings in order to maximize the may choose not to award equity compensation, which eliminates fraud at the expense of managerial e¤ort.
As agency costs decrease, shareholders will eventually choose to award equity compensation, which induces e¤ort and may also induce fraud. The compensation contract o¤ered to the manager, whether or not it induces fraud, maximizes shareholder payo¤s given the limited contracting context of the manager-shareholder relationship. Hence, unless regulatory interevention is somehow able to increase the degree of contractibility between manager and shareholder, such interventions are likely reduce shareholder welfare.
Third, contrary to what is sometimes stated in the literature on securities fraud, a reduction in agency costs does not necessarily lead to a reduction in fraud. To the contrary, when agency costs are high, marginal reductions in agency costs will lead to an increase in fraud. This is because shareholders control compensation, and will rein in a manager too predisposed to commit fraud by limiting or eliminating the manager's equity compensation, which reduces or eliminates the manager's incentive to commit fraud. If agency costs are relatively low, shareholders will award equity compensation to achieve approximately their preferred policies on e¤ort and disclosure. If fraud is seen as a major problem in and of itself, such as by producing signi…cant externalities, reducing agency costs may be undesirable.
Finally, an additional, though less detailed result, bears on the usage of corporate …nes (often referred to as "vicarious liability" in the legal literature, since the …rm is vicariously liable for the actions of its managers) as opposed to personal sanctions levied against the manager. To the extent that shareholders desire fraud -which they do because of their short term interests -personal sanctions on the manager are ine¤ective deterrents because the shareholders can always make it worth the manager's while by heaping on more and more stock compensation. In contrast, …nes against the corporation actually decrease equity compensation's e¢ cacy in encouraging fraud.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, styled as a one shot game between strategic players: shareholders, the manager, and purchasers. Section 3 presents a solution in the form of each player's optimal strategies at each stage of the game. Section 4 analyzes the solution and presents results. Section 5 concludes.
Here I present a model of agency costs in a …rm with endogenous compensation. There are three aspects to agency costs in this model. First, the manager's e¤ort, which positively impacts the expected value of the …rm, is not observable or veri…able. Second, the manager may face costs from securities fraud that shareholders do not; these costs may be reputational, moral, or legal. Third, to the extent that the manager owns shares of the …rm, the manager may have shorter term interests with regard to the stock price of the …rm than do the shareholders. This assumption is common in the legal literature on securities fraud: it is presumed that managers are not in it for the long term (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2009)) , and may maximize short term stock price at the expense of long term stock price and performance.
Shareholders can, to an extent, remedy this con ‡ict of interest via contract. Contracting in this model is imperfect, in that shareholders have only one contractual instrument at their disposal: they can award to the manager a number of shares of the company. If the shareholders award zero stock, the manager's preference for sloth and truthtelling prevails. As shareholders award more stock, the manager will be incentivized to exert e¤ort, but also to falsely in ‡ate her report regarding the …rm's value.
The economy
The economy in this model consists of …ve types of entities:
1. The …rm, which has a production technology and N shares of stock outstanding 2. N identical shareholders, who each own a share of stock of the …rm and choose the manager's compensation contract 3. The manager, who may exert e¤ort to increases the …rm's likelihood of a good outcome, and who also makes a disclosure to the marketplace concerning the …rm's value 4. Purchasers, who stand ready to purchase the …rm's shares for their conditional expected value, given the manager's report of value 5. A regulator, who assesses a …ne of l against the …rm in the event that the manager reports falsely
The Firm
The …rm can be one of two types: 2 fH; Lg: High type …rms have cash ‡ows per share of H: Low type …rms have cash ‡ows of L; which I let equal 0 without loss of generality. While type is completely deterministic of cash ‡ows, a …rm's type is in ‡uenced by managerial e¤ort e 2 f0; 1g. I write the general probability of the …rm's type as e Pr(Hje); where 1 = Pr(Hje = 1) and 0 = Pr(Hje = 0); where
0, and 1 0 : The unconditional expected value per share of a …rm whose manager exerts e¤ort is 1 H; if the manager does not exert e¤ort, the expected value is 0 H.
Shareholders
There are N shareholders who each own a share of the …rm, and are entitled to all of the …rm's cash ‡ows. In order to a¤ect the manager's choice of e¤ort and disclosure decisions, the shareholders may choose to award a number of shares of the …rm to the manager; each shareholder then contributes =N to the manager's equity compensation. I assume that this compensation level is observable to shareholders and the manager only; this tracks the reality that shareholders can always choose, ex post, to reward the manager, and they cannot commit not to. After choosing the manager's compensation contract, some exogenous proportion of shareholders will wish to sell their shares, which occurs after the manager chooses e¤ort and makes a disclosure about the …rm's type; is then the degree of shareholders'short term interest, while (1 ) is the shareholder's long term interest in the …rm's performance and stock price. The market price p( 0 ) that shareholders receive for selling their shares is a function of the manager's publicly observable report. If the …rm is found by the regulator to have committed fraud, the shareholders who have not sold each bear a …ne of l per share, while those who did sell simply keep their sale proceeds; this functions simiarly to actual corporate penalties in the U.S. securities antifraud regime.
The expected value of the shareholder's payo¤ is then
I assume that N is very large relative to the manager's compensation, making the value of compensation paid to the manager insigni…cant for the shareholder's purposes (i.e., =N 0). 3 This allows the shareholder's payo¤ function to be written more simply without the =N term as:
The Manager
The manager has two sets of actions in this game. He gets to choose whether to exert e¤ort or not e 2 f0; 1g, at personal cost to himself of c(0) = 0; c(1) = c: E¤ort increases the likelihood of the …rm achieving high cash ‡ows.
The manager observes the …rm's type , and then makes a report 0 to the marketplace of the …rm's type. In this report, the manager may choose to tell the truth ( = 0 ); or lie ( 6 = 0 ). After making this report, the manager sells exogenous proportion m of his shares, and retains proportion 1 m : If the manager does not sell his stock, he also bears a …ne of l per share for fraud. The proportion of stock sold m is thus the manager's short term interest, while 1 m is her long term interest.
In general, I assume that the manager has a slight preference for not overreporting the …rm's value. This re ‡ects, perhaps, reputational capital of the manager or the possibility for individual sanctions. Formally, I
denote this manager-speci…c cost of fraud as R(
The expected value of the manager's payo¤ manager's payo¤ is then:
Purchasers into account the incentives of both shareholders in choosing and the manager in choosing e and 0 . The purchaser's individual rationality (IR) constraint is then
The regulator
The regulator imposes a …ne against the …rm if the regulator determines that there has been fraud.
Because the …ne is levied against the …rm, it is e¤ectively borne by the shareholders of the …rm. I assume, for simplicity, that the regulator ensures that purchasers are left unharmed by the …nes (that is, the regulator only …nes the non-selling shareholders, which is a fairly accurate approximation of how the current securities fraud class action system works (see Spindler 2009)). This assumption keeps l from a¤ecting the purchaser's IR constraint, but does not a¤ect the overall analysis. I assume that there is perfect enforcement of fraudulent overstatements of value:
Because enforcement is perfect in the sense of zero type 1 and type 2 error, one might suppose that the best enforcement strategy is always a …ne of in…nity. This is trivially true. However, I assume that the regulator is unable to do that, perhaps because of heterogeneity of …rms, judgment proofness, concerns about fairness, deadweight losses of regulatory sanctions (such as forcing a …rm into bankruptcy), or because of concerns about type 1 error that are not explicitly incorporated into the model. One useful concept that this captures is that …rms may have di¤erent costs and detectability of fraud, value of projects, and managerial predispositions, which means that a set level of …ne will not be appropriate for all …rms in all situations.
In addition, for simplicity, I assume that only the old shareholders of the …rm bear the cost of the …ne, and that new purchasers do not. This re ‡ects the real-world right of purchasers to recover against the …rm for fraud and a policy preference that defrauded purchasers not be further harmed by punitive action against the …rm, and simpli…es the purchasers'IR constraint.
The sequence of play
Putting the action sequence of the game in chronological order:
1. The regulator randomly chooses a level of …ne per share for fraud, l > 0, which is observed by all:
2. Shareholders may choose to award share shares of the …rm to the manager, 0:
3. The manager has the choice to exert e¤ort e 2 f0; 1g; where e¤ort is costly, c(0) = 0; c(1) = c:
4. The manager observes the …rm's type, 2 fH; Lg:
5. The manager makes a disclosure to the marketplace of the …rm's type: 0 2 fH; Lg: The manager may choose to tell the truth about the …rm's type ( 0 = ) or lie ( 0 6 = ).
6. Proportion of shareholders sell their shares, and the manager sells proportion m of the manager's shares. Purchasers break even in expectation; that is, the price is determined subject to the purchasers' individual rationality (IR) constraint.
7. A …ne of l is assessed against each of the …rm's non-selling shareholders if the regulator …nds that there has been fraud.
The formal model is then:
Obj : max
c(e) R( 0 ; )
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/art107
An equilibrium consists of a price given the manager's signal, the manager's choice of disclosure signal given type and share grant , the manager's choice of e¤ort given , and the shareholder's choice of :
3 Solving for equilibrium I solve for the shareholders'and manager's choices by backward induction. Proceeding from the last stage of the game, the purchaser prices the …rm's shares so as to break even in expectation. In the penultimate stage, the manager makes a decision whether to report truthfully or not to maximize her expected payo¤s given the …rm's type. In the second stage, the manager decides whether to exert e¤ort or not. Finally, in the …rst stage, the shareholders choose the manager's compensation.
The purchaser' s pricing decision
The purchaser's IR constraint determines the price p for which shareholders and the manager can sell their shares. Given the manager's signal, the price is the conditional expected value of the share -i.e., the purchasers break even in conditional expectation.
While purchasers do not observe share compensation , the manager's choice of e¤ort, or the manager's disclosure policy, they do anticipate these factors in equilibrium. In pure strategies, the manager either always discloses truthfully or else will disclose a falsely in ‡ated value (i.e., ( 0 ; ) = (H; L)): There is also the possibility that managers will employ a mixed strategy, sometimes disclosing falsely and sometimes disclosing truthfully. In both the pooling and the mixing equilibria, the equilibrium price paid will vary depending upon whether the purchasers believe that the manager would have exerted e¤ort.
In a separating equilibrium,
In a pure strategy pooling equilibrium,
Note that I assume that purchasers interpret a disclosure of L to be informative and hence p(L) = 0
(otherwise a pooling equilibrium is problematic since low type managers would prefer to disclose L to avoid the …ne of l for disclosing high.)
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, utilizing Bayes'law, we have
where x is the proportion (or likelihood) of managers of low type …rms that choose to falsely disclose high.
Finally, there can arise a case where shareholders will mix compensation strategies, although I defer discussion of this to the section on shareholder choice of compensation.
The manager' s disclosure decision
At the time that the manager decides which signal to send to the market, she knows the type of the …rm ( 2 fH; Lg) as well as her share of the …rm's ownership, : Things are relatively simple where equity compensation is not awarded: if = 0, the manager's personal reputational concerns R dominate, and she always reports truthfully. If the …ne l is low enough relative to the manager's short term interest m , and the equity grant is high enough, the manager will prefer fraudulent disclosure in the low state ( = L).
As the …ne gets higher, the manager will commit less fraud: as l increases relative to m , the manager goes from always lying when equity compensation is high, to sometimes lying when equity compensation is low and always lying when it is high, to sometimes lying at all equity compensation levels greater than zero, to never lying when the …ne l is very high.
Restating these results more formally, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Depending upon the …ne l, there exist up to two cuto¤ levels of equity compensation, x R m H (1 m )l and p R m e H (1 m )l ; where the manager (i) always tells the truth when < x _ x < 0,
(ii) plays a mixed disclosure strategy (lying in the low state with probability x) when 2 [ x ; p )^ x ; p > 0 or > x > 0^ p < 0; and (iii) always lies in the low state when > p^ p > 0. The proof follows.
Separating equilibrium
In order for a separating equilibrium to result, it must be the case that IC2 is satis…ed in that the manager of a low type …rm must prefer to disclosure truthfully:
In the case where = 0 (the shareholders grant the manager no shares of stock), the manager always prefers to tell the truth because R is strictly positive.
If > 0; rearranging yields a lower bound for l :
H, no level of compensation can induce non-separating behavior.
This can be rearranged to given an upper bound for that maintains separation (assuming l <
The term x denotes the level of equity compensation at which a manager will switch from always telling the truth (separation) to sometimes lying (mixing at rate x).
I assume that R is small both in relation to c and the …rm's overall value, N e H. There are two reasons for making this assumption. First, it simpli…es things. In this case, it allows one to write the separating condition as:
The second reason is that it makes it easier to capture the dynamic that equity compensation both encourages fraud and encourages e¤ort, and that encouraging more e¤ort encourages more fraud. This assumption ensures that shareholders cannot, for some values of l, induce e¤ort without inducing fraud. This assumption is not necessary to capture the dynamic, as I show in Appendix A, though it does make it easier to describe.
[See appendix for more detail on this assumption.]
Pooling equilibrium
In order for pooling to take place, it must be that managers of low type …rms prefer to disclose high rather than to tell the truth and receive a payo¤ of zero:
In the case where = 0; the manager's personal cost of fraud R makes truthful disclosure a dominant strategy, and no pooling equilibrium will exist. Following the earlier assumption that R is relatively very small (re ‡ecting only a weak preference on the manager's part), then even a relatively trivial stock grant makes truthful disclosure no longer a dominant strategy. We then obtain the following condition.
Again with the assumption that R is small, this is more simply written as:
Mixed strategy equilibrium
For a certain range of l; namely l + equilibrium. In such a case, managers will pursue a mixed strategy where they lie with probability x in the low state, and tell the truth with probability 1 x. In order for managers to be willing to mix, managers of low type …rms must be indi¤erent between disclosing high (which entails receiving the mixed strategy price p x and bearing the risk of liability l) and disclosing low (and receiving zero). Formally,
The purchaser's pricing decision in the mixed strategy case (Eq. 1) gives the condition that, to break even, the price must be p x = e H( e + x(1 e )) 1 : Combing these yields a solution for x :
There are multiple equilibria, since there are potentially in…nite ( ; x) pairs that solve Eq.5. As R= ! 0, which I generally assume to be the case,
; which has only one solution:
Remark 3 The likelihood of disclosing falsely in the low state, x; is increasing in the e¤ ort level e . This is because the gains from fraud are higher: where the equilibrium strategy is to exert e¤ ort, the pooling/mixing price will consequently be higher.
While p x is, in a sense, nailed down by the exogenous parameters m and l, it is still a function of the level of e¤ort e and consequent probability of success e in that the range of l in which the manager will mix depends upon whether the manager had earlier undertaken e¤ort (in the sense that it was subgame perfect for her to do so). The range of …ne l in which mixing behavior is possible can be further subdivided: for
, the manager will mix only if it was optimal for her to undertake e¤ort in the prior stage of the game; otherwise, she will play a pure strategy of falsely reporting in the low state. In the higher subdivision of the range, i.e. for l +
; the manager will always mix, even if it was not optimal to undertake e¤ort in the prior subgame.
Summing up
The attached …gure summarizes the manager's potential disclosure strategies as the …ne l changes. With the simpli…cation that R ! 0 + , we can characterize the manager's behavior as a function of l and . Where = 0 the manager always tells the truth. For > 0, the manager's behavior depends upon l and the equilibrium e¤ort level e . Along the continuum of possible …nes, the leftmost region (where l is the lowest), denoted as zone M1; is one of pure pooling behavior, regardless of prior e¤ort level. Moving rightward, the next zone of behavior (zone M2) is where the manager pools if it was not optimal to undertake e¤ort in the prior stage, and mixes if the opposite is true. Moving again rightward, in zone M3, the manager chooses to mix no matter the prior optimal e¤ort choice. Finally, in the rightmost range, zone M4, the manager chooses to disclose truthfully without regard to the prior e¤ort level.
The manager' s choice of e¤ort
The manager chooses e¤ort after the …ne l and compensation level are set, but before she has has observed the …rm's type and before she makes a disclosure to the marketplace. However, the manager can backward induce both her own disclosure decision and the market's equilibrium response to it in the subsequent stages of the game. The manager, then, will make her choice of e¤ort taking these reactions into account.
The manager's e¤ort exertion behavior may be described in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If and l are such that the manager will separate (i.e., zone M1), the manager exerts e¤ ort
and chooses e = 0 if < s : Where and l are such that the manager will not engage in pure separating behavior (i.e., in zones M2, M3, and M4), the manager exerts e¤ ort if
and chooses e = 0 if < p .
The proof follows.
E¤ort in the separating case
If the …ne l is high enough that the manager will choose to disclose truthfully regardless of the …rm's type and regardless of the optimal e¤ort level (Zone M4 in Figure 1 ), we ask simply whether the manager would do better o¤ incurring the cost of e¤ort and enjoying a higher probability that her equity share is valuable, as opposed to slacking. Formally, the condition for the exertion of e¤ort is:
Solving this for pins down the minimum equity share for which the manager will exert e¤ort in the separating case:
E¤ort in the pooling case
Where the …ne l is very low (l m 1 m H in Zone 1 in Figure 1 ), pooling is always the optimal strategy regardless of the e¤ort choice. Thus, a defection from exerting (or not exerting) e¤ort does not a¤ect the manager's subsequent disclosure behavior, The e¤ect, then, of a defection from a given level of e¤ort is the altered chance of success and whether the cost of e¤ort c is incurred.
The manager will exert e¤ort e = 1 if the following is true:
This may be rewritten as:
The …rst term on the left hand side is the manager's expected increased share payo¤ from exerting e¤ort:
is the change in likelihood that the …rm's project will be successful due to the manager's e¤ort, is the manager's share of the …rm, (1 m ) is the likelihood that the manager will retain her shares and receive the …rm's cash ‡ows and any liability, and …nally (H + l) is the marginal pecuniary bene…t to a shareholder of the project's success (H is the cash ‡ow received, while l is the liability avoided). The second term on the left hand side is the expected personal bene…t to the manager from exerting e¤ort: with increased probability of ; the project will be successful, meaning the manager will not lie and will not incur personal costs of R. On the right hand side, c is the cost of the manager's e¤ort.
Since price as a function of e¤ort, p e , drops out, there is no need to check separately whether the manager would choose to defect from a state in which managers are not exerting e¤ort, as the conditions will be the same.
Rearranging, this condition also pins down the level of share ownership necessary for the manager to exert e¤ort in the pooling case (denoted as p ):
E¤ort in the mixing case (Zone 3)
The following equation de…nes the condition for the manager to exert e¤ort in Zone 3, with the left hand side giving equilibrium behavior of e = 1, and the right hand side giving the payo¤ for a defection to e = 0:
From the manager's mixing condition, Eq. 4, ( m p x (1 m ) l) R = 0, and the above then reduces to:
which is the same as in the pooling case. The level of equity compensation necessary to induce e¤ort is therefore the same as well: ; the manager will pool if the equilibrium outcome is to exert e¤ort (e = 1) and mix if the equilibrium outcome is to slack (e = 0).
Taking …rst the pooling case, in order for a manager not to defect from exerting e¤ort, the following must be true:
This is identical to the pure pooling equilibrium (Zone 1), and yields the same minimum level of equity compensation to induce e¤ort:
In the case where the manager would not exert e¤ort (e = 0) and mix her disclosure strategy, the manager will choose not to defect if:
Solving for the maximum bound of equity compensation to induce no e¤ort,
which again yields the same threshold level of compensation p :
Shareholder' s choice of compensation
In this section, the …nal step of the backward induction problem is reached: the shareholder's choice of compensation for the manager. Compensation has a dual role: a su¢ cient grant of equity can induce e¤ort, which we might suppose shareholders generally want, and can also induce fraud in the low state, which shareholders may or may not want depending upon the relative levels of …ne l and shareholder short term interest . Thus, the interesting problem arises when there is a tradeo¤ of sorts: what if the shareholders want e¤ort exerted, but know that awarding the requisite compensation to induce e¤ort may also result in more fraud than the shareholders prefer?
Before getting to that question, I …rst describe two important assumptions, which can together be summed up as (i) the gain to the …rm from the manager's e¤ort is much larger than the cost of that e¤ort, and (ii) the cost of e¤ort is much greater than the manager's personal cost of fraud. I give more detail on this assumption in Appendix A, but describe their relevance brie ‡y here.
First, in order to ensure that shareholders desire that managers exert e¤ort, all else being equal, I assume that c and are su¢ ciently small relative to N H, the overall gain from the manager's exertion of e¤ort.
This seems to be true in large …rms: if one examines executive compensation of the top corporate o¢ cers in large public …rms such as GE and Apple, one …nds that top executive compensation is well under a percent of overall costs. Despite the frenzied preoccupation with the levels of executive pay, it seems unlikely that the amount of such compensation currently a¤ects shareholder welfare in a directly signi…cant way for the vast majority of large …rms. In order to further simplify the analysis, since and c are already assumed to be small, I let =N ! 0 and drop it from the shareholder's payo¤ function altogether. This greatly reduces the arduousness of the algebra.
Second, in order to ensure that there is a meaningful tradeo¤ between e¤ort and disclosure policy, I
assume that R=c ! 0; which is su¢ cient to ensure that x s and p p . 6 In other words, the e¤ect of this conditions is that managers are induced to lie (if the level of …ne l is low enough) before they are induced to exert e¤ort. Even without this assumption, some tradeo¤ will typically exist: unless R is high relative to c, there will be some level of l small enough that x s : Note that if R is indeed high, there is no problem presented by agency costs in the model: shareholders will always be able to induce either truthful or deceitful e¤ort, depending upon their preference, although obtaining the optimal fraud level may not be possible. The game would then be equivalent to one in which the marginal bene…t of e¤ort = 0;
With these assumptions in hand, I turn to the issue of how shareholders choose to award equity compensation. In doing so, shareholders will consider the joint e¤ect of compensation upon e¤ort and fraud.
I therefore divide the analysis by which zone, M1 -M4, the manager is in. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5
In M1 and M2: Equity compensation of = p is an equilibrium if
If neither of these conditions are met, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the shareholder mixes at rate s, given as
with a market price p s of
The shareholder awards equity compensation of = p if
If neither condition is met, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the shareholder mixes at rate s and price p s :
In M4: Equity compensation of = is always an equilibrium.
Choice of compensation in zone M1
Assuming that R=c ! 0, when the …ne l 2 [0; m 1 m H); the manager will report truthfully in the low state if = 0, will always lie in the low state given > 0; and will exert e¤ort if p . 7 Since x < p < p , the shareholder has three choices: truthful reporting without e¤ort ( 2 [0; x ), mixed reporting without e¤ort ( 2 [ x ; p )) ; false reporting without e¤ort ( 2 [ p ; p )), and false reporting with e¤ort ( p ). Hence, to minimize the payment to the manager in each case, the shareholder chooses among 2 f0; x ; p ; p g :
The non-separating, non-e¤ ort inducing levels of compensation, f x ; p g; cannot be equilibria.
Proof. In order for either x or p to be an equilibrium, the shareholder must not prefer to defect to p . We have as a necessary condition
, which can never be true since p x + (1 ) H > p x (1 ) l and
Lemma 7 The non-separating, e¤ ort-inducing level of compensation p is an equilibrium if and only if
Proof. In order for p to be an equilibrium, the shareholder must prefer not to defect to = 0; x ; p : It is apparent that defections to x and p are never feasible since it must always be that 1 (
In the pooling case where y = 1, the condition is always true since p 1 + (1 ) H > p 1 (1 ) l and 1 > 0 : If p 1 (1 ) l > 0, the RHS is maximized if x = 1, and hence a defection to mixing is dominated by a defection to pooling.
If p 1 (1 ) l < 0 (which must always be the case as R=c ! 0), then a defection to pooling is dominated by a defection to mixing ( x , in which y = x 2 (0; 1)); which is in turn dominated by a defection to = 0 (where y = 0).
7 There is technically another option, which is to award 2 ( x; p), which results in mixed disclosure by the manager and no e¤ort. However, this is dominated by both = 0 when R=c ! 0 and by = p even if R=c 6 ! 0:
As the only remaining necessary condition for p to be an equilibrium, then, it must be that the shareholder would not defect to the truthtelling level of compensation ( = 0).
The necessary condition for = 0 to be an equilibrium is l
Proof. In order for = 0 to be an equilibrium, it must be preferable to defections to x ; a p ; p . Defections to x ; p occur if the following does not hold:
, where y = 1 if = p and y = x if = x : If H (1 ) l < 0, then the inequality must be true. If H (1 ) l > 0, then a defection to p would be preferable. This leaves as the necessary condition that a shareholder does not prefer a defection to p :
There exists a range of l 2 (
in which there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In such a case, the shareholder mixes at rate s =
Proof. Conditions 6 and 7 are not exhaustive:
If l is in this range, the shareholder will choose to defect from to 0, and also from 0 to : In order for the shareholder to not choose to defect either way, the shareholder mix between and 0 at a rate a (where a denotes the probability of awarding ) such that the market price makes the shareholder indi¤erent between compensation strategies. This occurs when
,
Because purchasers must always break even in expectation, the price paid will take into account the equilibrium rate at which the shareholder mixes. The price p a , may be written as a function of , the rate at which the shareholder employs compensation of : The price is then the Bayesian updated of the probability of the …rm's being of high type given a high signal, times the payo¤ (H) when the …rm is of high type:
Equations 8 and 10 allow one to solve for the rate of mixing .
With some algebra one can show that the the only way s > 0 is for the numerator and denominator to both be positive, which implies as a condition that l 2 (1 1 )(1 ) H;
In addition, one can verify that in order for s < 1, it must also be that l > (1 )(1 1 ) H + 1 0 H: Hence the shareholder mixes when l 2 (1 1 )(1 ) H + 1 0 H; (1 1 )(1 ) H + 1 H ; the boundaries of which correspond to the upper bound for awarding p and the lower bound for = 0 as pure strategies, respectively.
Remark 10 Nowhere in zone M1 does the level of the manager's short term interest, m , have any e¤ ect on either the likelihood of fraud or the likelihood that e¤ ort will be exerted.
Choice of compensation in zone M2
In zone M2; the manager will tell the truth if = 0, will mix disclosure at rate x if = x , and will always lie in the low state if = p . The same logic as in zone M1 holds here to show that x cannot be an equilibrium. The shareholder is left to choose between = 0 and = p , with conditions identical to Eqs.
6 -11 in the zone M1 analysis.
Choice of compensation in zone M3
In zone M3, managers will play a mixing strategy: given that the …rm is of low type, a manager receiving compensation of will falsely disclose high value with probability x; which results in price p x : If compensation is = 0, the manager always tells the truth, resulting in a price given a high signal of H and zero otherwise.
If the level of …ne l is high enough, either = or = 0 may be an equilibrium.
In order for to be an equilibrium in M3, it must be that the shareholder prefers to a defection to any of 2 f0; x ; p g. That is,
where
0 if defection to = 0
One can immediately dismiss x , since the RHS of the inequality must be maximized at either y = 0 or y = 1, depending on whether p x (1 ) l ? 0. Under the assumption R=c ! 0, it must be that p x (1 ) l < 0, and consequently it must also be that p is not a viable defection, either. It is only left to consider when a shareholder might consider a defection to = 0.
To make this less complicated, I take the limit of the expression as R=c ! 0 and plug in terms for p x and x. It is somewhat easier algebraically to proceed by letting l = m 1 m kH ; where k 2 ( 1 ; 0). In terms of k, we get the following condition:
This means that the …ne must be su¢ ciently large in order to maintain p as an equilibrium. This is because net shareholder payo¤s, as given in Eq.12, are actually increasing in l because, while an increase in l subjects the shareholder to greater liability in the event of false disclosure, an increase in l has the salutary e¤ect of decreasing the rate x at which the manager mixes and increasing the price p x that the shareholder receives for selling his share. Note that this the condition is only meaningful agency costs are su¢ ciently large. Where m = , for instance, the RHS of Eq.13 is negative, and any level of …ne l is su¢ cient to maintain p as an equilibrium. An intuitive interpretation of this condition is that if the …ne is large relative to the degree of agency cost, then shareholder and manager interests are well enough aligned that the manager's mixing strategy x is acceptably palatable to the shareholder. In zone M3, then, it is only when agency costs are relatively high that p may fail to be an equilibrium. When they are low, shareholders will always award p .
A high enough …ne l makes = 0 an equilibrium. The condition for this to obtain is
One can show that x ; p need not be considered, since if H (1 ) l < 0, the shareholder would not defect, while if H (1 ) l > 0, the shareholder which is identical to the condition (Eq. 7) for awarding zero equity in the pure pooling cases of zone M1 and M2. This gives the equilibrium condition
The bigger the gain from an exertion of managerial e¤ort ( ), the greater must l be in order to sustain the non-e¤ort equilibrium.
What happens in zone M3 when the …ne is such that neither = 0 nor = is an equilibrium? In such a case, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium: shareholders would defect from to 0 and back again.
There is, however, at least one mixed strategy equilibrium: the shareholder can mix at rate a between = 0 and = such that the equilibrium price, p a , makes the shareholder indi¤erent between the two compensation strategies. The conditions for shareholder mixing are in fact identical to those in zones M1
and M2 (Eqs. 8 -11); this is so because the shareholder's mixing has the e¤ect of raising the price above the manager's mixing price, p a > p x ; and for any price greater than p x , the manager strictly prefers to lie in the low state.
Lemma 11 When the shareholder mixes between 0 and p , the manager will always choose to pool when equity compensation is p and will report truthfully when it is 0.
Proof. Given that equity compensation is , the manager chooses to report falsely in the low state if the payo¤ from lying exceeds the payo¤ from telling the truth (which equals zero). From this, one …nds that the manager reports falsely in the low state (and will not mix) if, and only if, the price is above p x :
The shareholder mixes only when he is indi¤erent between awarding and awarding 0, or, formally, when Eq. 8 holds. One can show that 8 implies 15. First, if the shareholder prefers to mix instead of playing a pure strategy (such as = ), it must be true that the shareholder's payo¤ from mixing exceeds the expected payo¤ from playing pure :
Since this is true everywhere, it must also be true when x = 1:
Rearranging and canceling terms,
That is, the equilibrium price p a when the shareholder mixes is greater than the equilibrium price when the manager mixes, p x : Because p a > p x , it cannot be that the manager will be indi¤erent between lying and telling the truth when the …rm is of low type. In particular, she will strictly prefer lying, since the payo¤ from lying ( m p a (1 m ) l) is strictly greater than the payo¤ from telling the truth (0) :
Zone M4
If the …ne is high enough such that l m 1 m H, the manager always prefers to tell the truth when the the …rm is of low type. Since m ; this means that the shareholder must also prefer to tell the truth since
Hence, the shareholder will always award equity compensation of = , and the manager will always exert e¤ort and report truthfully.
4 Analysis: the relationship between fraud, e¤ort, and agency costs What does this model tell us about the e¤ect of agency costs on fraud, compensation, and e¤ort? While the parameters of the model allow for quite a lot of variation in incentives and behavior, one can still draw several general insights. As I will discuss below in more detail:
1. Fraud and e¤ort are positively correlated, and fraud is more likely to occur as the gains from e¤ort increase.
2. The incidence of fraud-inducing compensation is increasing as agency costs are reduced.
3. A reduction in agency costs leads to an increase in the incidence of fraud when agency costs are high, and leads to either a decrease or no change in the incidence of fraud when agency costs are low (and any decrease is attributable to a change in managerial preferences, not resolution of the agency con ‡ict).
4. The two separate types of sanctions -corporate …ne l and personal managerial penalty R -have distinct e¤ects on the choice of e¤ort, fraud, and compensation.
The relation between fraud and e¤ort
Fraud and e¤ort are positively correlated. Shareholders never award x ; p , and as a consequence the only time that fraud never occurs is when shareholders award = 0 and e = 0, or when the manager happens to be in zone M4.
Further, fraud is more likely to occur when the gains from e¤ort are higher. From an inspection of the manager's disclosure conditions, one can see that a greater …ne l is required to maintain separation as 1 increases (l by Eqs.6 and 13. Letting 1 = 0 + !, these may be rewritten in terms of the gain to e¤ort:
Taking the derivatives with respect to !, one can verify that the RHS of 6 0 is increasing in !, while the RHS of 13 0 is decreasing, meaning that each condition is getting more slack as the gains to e¤ort increase. (One can also verify that the conditions to maintain the truthtelling equilibria, = 0, of Eqs. 7 and 14 grow more restrictive as ! increases). Hence, holding everything else constant, increases in the marginal product of managerial e¤ort should tend to induce a greater incidence of lying from managers given that …rm type is low, and should also tend to increase the propensity of shareholders to award compensation that induces the manager to commit fraud.
This relationship has important regulatory implications. Consider the perspective of an outsider who sees that fraud is committed and the compensation paid to managers, but cannot observe e¤ort. The outsider in this model would see that all …rms that commit fraud have fraud-inducing compensation packaged ( = ),
and would see that all …rms that commit fraud have ex post valuations that are low ( = L). Because poor performance is correlated both with fraud and high compensation, the outsider may make the additional leap to conclude that high compensation causes fraud (which is true) and that high compensation and fraud cause the low ex post performance (which is false). The outsider may believe that one could increase overall welfare by enacting policies that reduce or eliminate the incidence of fraud; for instance, by prohibiting compensation packages of . However, that has the unintended consequence of eliminating e¤ort and reducing overall …rm value by a factor of . While there is likely some o¤setting bene…t from the elimination of fraud (such as viability of follow-on projects and improved liquidity), such a policy is likely to be an overall detriment.
This same point is true for an outsider who wishes to raise corporate …nes l. Suppose that substantial agency costs exist ( m >> ), and that the outsider can choose one of two …ne levels l 1 < l 2 : Suppose further that l 1 ; l 2 m 1 m 0 H, meaning that the manager will want to commit fraud no matter what the …ne level so long as > 0. Finally, suppose that
This means that the shareholder will award p with l 1 but will award = 0 with l 2 . That is, while a move from l 1 to l 2 will eliminate fraud, it will also eliminate e¤ort and destroy H of value. If agency costs are high, increases in …nes will be relatively ine¤ective in deterring manager's fraud decision given > 0, but will deter shareholders from awarding the e¢ cient compensation package .
Reducing agency costs increases fraud-inducing compensation
In this model, it is true that large performance-based compensation packages (i.e., ) lead to fraud. One interesting thing that this model generates, though, is that the incidence of fraud-inducing compensation is actually increasing as agency costs decline. Consider what happens as m declines, taking as our starting point when m and l are such that the manager is in zone M1/M2. Assume that p is an equilibrium (Eq.6 is satis…ed). The fact that p is an equilibrium in M1/M2 implies that it must also be an equilibrium in M3. In fact, one can show formally that, in general, the awardance of is non-declining as m declines toward (i.e., as agency costs decrease), as I do in the following three propositions:
Proposition 12 As m declines to , if the shareholder awards in zone M1/M2, the shareholder also awards in zone M3 and M4:
Proof. Eq.6 gives as the condition for p in M1/M2 that
0, while Eq.12 gives as the condition for p in M3 that
Since p x > p 1 and p 1 (1 ) l < 0 (which must be true since by assumption since the manager being in zone M3 means that l > m 1 m 1 H > 1 1 H); it follows that Eq.6 implies Eq.12. Finally, as m decreases to the point that the manager is in zone M4, s is always an equilibrium.
Proposition 13
As m declines to , if the shareholder played mixed strategy s in M1/M2, the shareholder will either mix at rate s or play a pure strategy of in M3.
Proof. From What this means is that the incidence of fraud-inducing compensation weakly increases as agency costs decrease (in the sense of m ! ). Even if is not an equilibrium in M1/M2, it may become an equilibrium in M3 (for agency costs su¢ ciently low in M3, p is always an equilibrium), and p is always becomes one in M4.
Note that the results of Propositions [12] and [13] above do not rely on the gain from e¢ ciency being greater than zero. In general, the shareholders will play at some point in M3 so long as shareholders prefer some level of fraud, i.e., l < 1 H. Suppose 1 = 0 = and m , , and l are such that 1 H < l < m 1 m H and l < 1 H. This means that the shareholder would prefer some fraud but, on the whole, the manager will, if granted equity compensation, commit a super-optimal amount of fraud, such that the shareholder will not choose to award the equity compensation all the time; instead, the shareholder mixes at
Consider then what happens as m ! : by continuity of x, there will be a point where the manager mixes disclosure at exactly the same rate that the shareholder would want, and hence the shareholder plays a pure strategy of = p . If l 1 H, then the shareholder will award only when the manager moves into M4 as m declines toward : As in the case where > 0, the incidence of fraud-inducing compensation is weakly increasing as m ! .
We can sum up Propositions In general, there are two e¤ects, depending on how great the degree of agency con ‡ict is:
8 It is never the case that shareholders would switch from = 0 to a mixed strategy of s in M3. This is because mixed strategy s achieves the same result in M1/M2 as it does in M3: the manager's disclosure practice is exactly the same. This is also true of pure strategy = 0, and hence changes in m cannot switch the shareholder's preference between 0 and s strategies.
Proposition 16 When agency costs are "large" in the sense that shareholders choose not to award as a pure strategy, incremental decreases in agency costs can only have the e¤ ect of increasing the incidence of fraud.
Proof. From Corollary [15] , agency costs are "large" in the cases where the shareholder plays either s or 0 in M1/M2. In these "large" cases, the shareholder will at some point switch to in M3 as m ! . From Propositions [2] and [4], compensation of = 0 induces no fraud and no e¤ort, while induces both fraud at rate x and e¤ort in M3. Therefore, the only possible e¤ect of a small decrease in m when agency costs are large is that the incidence of fraud increases from either 0 or s (1 1 ) to x (1 1 ) : This result also holds as ! m Proposition 17 When agency costs are "small" in the sense that shareholders play as a pure strategy, incremental decreases in the manager's short term interest have the e¤ ect of decreasing incrementally the incidence of fraud, while incremental increases in shareholders'short term interests have no e¤ ect on fraud.
Proof. Once agency costs are "small" such that shareholders have chosen to award the equity inducing compensation , decreases in m cannot lead to more fraud. Rather, if those decreases occur while the manager is in zone M1/2 or M4, it causes no change in fraud levels. If m decreases in zone M3, the manager chooses to commit incrementally less fraud as x, which is a positive function of m from Eq.5, declines. One thing to note is that the declines in the incidence of fraud when agency costs are small are not really due to a decrease in agency costs per se. Rather, these declines are due to the change in the manager's preferences, not to any resolution of the divergence of interest between the manager and shareholders. If agency costs were to decrease because the shareholders'short term interest approaches that of the manager ( ! m ) , there would be no corresponding decrease in the incidence of fraud.
This result runs counter to the commonly stated assertion that corporate fraud, in the sense of overstating the …rm's value by managers, is the product of agency costs as between managers and shareholders, and that reducing agency costs will reduce the incidence of fraud. In the context of the model, this is not generally true. Instead, where agency costs are very high, reducing them can only increase the level of fraud, while the e¤ect of reducing agency costs when they are already small is ambiguous.
Corporate …nes (l) vs. manager penalties (R)
Even if R is large, a large personal …ne on the manager succeeds in limiting fraud only to the extent that it makes e¤ort without fraud achievable ( < x ; p ) ; and then only to the extent that shareholders do not desire fraud. So long as N H is large compared to R, shareholders will simply increase to achieve the desired e¤ect. E¤ort will always be awarded (which is a good thing), but to the extent that shareholders desire to incentivize fraud, they can simply increase the level of equity compensation until x ; p is reached.
Put another way, so long as R is small relative to the size of the …rm, changes in R may a¤ect shareholder incentives to commit fraud by changing the bundling of fraud and e¤ort compensation policies, but changes in R do not a¤ect shareholders'incentives to commit or ability to e¤ectuate fraud via compensation x; p .
In contrast, changes in the …ne l have an e¤ect upon the ability of the shareholders to incentivize fraud by making the manager more fraud averse. For a su¢ ciently high l relative to m , shareholders are unable to induce the manager to commit fraud via equity compensation. Additionally, increases in l a¤ect shareholder
Conclusion
This model describes the tradeo¤ inherent when shareholders choose the level of equity compensation to pay to the manager. Performance based compensation induces e¤ort, but also induces fraud. Hence, fraud and e¤ort may of necessity go together.
While shareholders themselves may desire some degree of fraud in light of their own short term interests, the case where managers'interests are more short term than those of the shareholders presents a divergence of interest where managers will tend to commit more fraud than shareholders would want.
As agency costs decrease and the interests of shareholders and managers become more aligned in terms of short term interest, shareholders will tend to award a higher level of performance based compensation.
In fact, as the interests of managers approach those of shareholders, shareholders will unambiguously award more performance based compensation. Reductions in agency costs actually increase the incidence of fraud when agency costs are high, but may reduce the incidence of fraud (or have no e¤ect) when agency costs are already low.
Finally, this model has implications for the choice of vicarious liability as opposed to managerial …nes.
Managerial …nes are unable to deter fraud that arises from the incentives of shareholders, while vicarious liability can be an e¤ective deterrent.
6 APPENDIX A: Assumptions on R and c I describe in greater detail the assumption regarding the relative sizes of R and c(e). The assumption, brie ‡y stated, is that equity compensation su¢ cient to induce e¤ort of e = 1 will result in:
pooling in zone M1 and M2 (that is, where l < 
H)
The …rst assumption requires that s > x and x > p ; which means that the equity compensation necessary to induce e¤ort in the separating equilibrium ( s ) is greater than the equity compensation that induces mixing behavior ( x ); and that the equity compensation necessary to induce e¤ort in the mixing equilibrium ( x ) is greater than the level of equity compensation that induces pooling (a p ). Consider the following example: l << m 1 m 1 H. Starting with an equity compensation of = 0, the manager will separate ( < x ), but will not exert any e¤ort ( < s ). Since shareholders desire e¤ort, they could incrementally try raising the manager's equity compensation. However, since by assumption s > x , before the manager is induced to exert e¤ort, the manager will switch from truthful disclosure to a mixed strategy. Suppose that the shareholders continue to raise the manager's compensation. Once again, before e¤ort is induced, the manager will switch from mixing to purely false disclosure (pooling), since x > p : If shareholders continue to raise the manager's equity compensation, they will reach the point, p , where the manager is induced to undertake e¤ort.
The second assumption requires only that s > x :
Formally, the …rst assumption ( s > x and x > p ) requires both the following two conditions to be met: From rearranging (1), there exists an l > 0 satifying (1) so long as m c R, which is a less strict condition than (2). Hence, the necessary condition for there to be some tradeo¤ is m c R, and for it to be a greater tradeo¤ in that the manager fully pools in zone M1/M2 before exerting e¤ort, m c R (1 m (1 1 )) 1 1 , which at its maximum as 1 ! 1 is m c (1 0 ) R: Since man-
